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(Prepared by the Editors)
In the previous issue of Indonesia (No. 36, October 1983), we offered readers a 
tentative, preliminary account of a remarkable series of interrelated changes in the 
leadership of the Indonesian Armed Forces, which began in March 1983. We noted 
that in terms of personnel the historic changes involved the final departure of the 
"Generation of '45" from active duty, and the emergence of a generation too young 
to have had any military experience in the Revolution. On the organizational level, 
we called attention to the first steps being taken to implement Law 20/1982, which 
specified that the functions of Minister of Defense and Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces (Pangab), hitherto normally held by a single person, would hence­
forth be entrusted to two separate individuals. Our political analysis concluded 
that these changes had been adroitly timed and shrewdly handled by President Su­
harto to tighten his grip on the Armed Forces under circumstances which might 
otherwise have threatened to loosen it.
Our account was, however, necessarily preliminary, in that although a large 
number of personnel changes had already taken place when we went to press, no­
thing had been made public as to the planned division of roles— and powei— between 
the Minister of Defense and the Pangab.
On August 23, 1983, however. Presidential Decree 46/1983 was made public, lay­
ing out in some detail the new organizational structure of the Ministry of Defense.1 
This was followed by the promulgation of Presidential Decree 60/1983, dated Novem­
ber 17, establishing in somewhat less specific terms the structures to be subordi­
nated to the Pangab. 2 Although a number of ambiguities remain unresolved, and a 
number of lacunae unfilled, we believe that the overall picture is sufficiently clear 
to permit a preliminary diagnosis— without waiting for the expected final clarifica­
tions scheduled for promulgation this April with the inauguration of the new Five- 
Year Plan. We expect to follow up this analysis with a supplement in the October 
1984 issue of Indonesia.
To assist our readers, we propose to divide our analysis into two: first we will 
discuss the formal functions and powers of, as well as appointments to, the Ministry 
of Defense and the Mabes ABRI (ABRI Headquarters); then we will turn to a con­
sideration of the political implications of the changes.
1. See Angkatan Bersenjata, August 25, 1983. On November 8 and 29 there fol­
lowed the inauguration of all officers appointed to fill both "Echelon I" and "Echelon 
II" positions in this structure. See ib id ., November 9 and 30, 1983.
2. See Sinar Harapan, November 23, 1983. The facts that this decree was apparent­
ly not published in the Armed Forces' newspaper and that it was not followed by a 
series of large-scale inaugurals underline in advance what we conclude from the fol­
lowing detailed analysis: namely, that the Pangab has inherited the great bulk of
the powers, functions, and key personnel of the combined Defense Ministry/ABRI 
Headquarters of the past, while the "new" Defense Ministry is indeed largely new.
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The Ministry of Defense. By the original terms of Presidential Decree 46/1983, 
the Minister was to be served directly by a so-called "Echelon I" of senior aides: 
namely, a Secretary-General; an Inspector-General; three Directors-General (for 
General Planning and Budgeting; for Personnel, Manpower, and Veterans' Affairs; 
and for Materiel, Facilities, and Services); an Agency Head (for Industrial/Techno­
logical Research and Development); and two Heads of Centers (Surveying and Map­
ping Center and Education and Training Center). Forming "Echelon II" were seven 
Bureau Chiefs under the Secretary-General; one Secretary and four Inspectors 
under the Inspector-General; one Secretary and three or four Directors under each 
Director-General; and one Secretary and three Chiefs of Centers under the Agency 
Head. Implementation of the decree has involved certain deviations from this struc­
ture, though none of them is of great importance. The Secretary-GeneraI "lost" one 
of his bureaux (Legal Management) to the Pangab, so now is in charge of only six. 
The Ministry lost the Surveying and Mapping Center to Mabes AB R I, but got, as it 
were in exchange, the National Reserves' Center (Puscadnas). It also took over 
the Defense Management Institute (now the Education and Training Center) and the 
Data Gathering and Processing Center (now the Data Collection and Processing Bu­
reau). (For the revised structure, see Chart I . )
The organizational picture that emerges suggests that this new Ministry is dras­
tically weaker than any of its precessors in the 38£ year old history of the Republic.
It has almost none of those functions that give real political power: intelligence, 
operations, logistics, territorial management, and functional group affairs. The 
functions it does have are essentially of a routine administrative or technical char­
acter. The core of the Ministry is a truncated version of the old Hankam's Admin­
istrative Staff— a connection underlined by the fact that Lt. Gen. Jogi Supardi, 
prior to becoming the new Secretary-General, was head of that now defunct staff. 
But if one compares the functions of the Secretary-General to that of the old Kasmin 
(Kepala Staf Administrasi), one notes that the former lacks the latter's authority 
over personnel, logistics, or finance.
Still more striking is the fact that, if we are to believe an explicit statement by 
the Minister himself, his Ministry will have no regional offices (Kantor Wilayah—  
Kanwil). 3 This means that unlike every other Ministry of importance. Defense will 
not have its own independent eyes and arms outside the capital and across the vast 
territory of Indonesia. All regional activity is thus to be the Pangab's responsibil­
ity, and the Minister will have to work through ( i .e . ,  effectively under) him.
The impression of weakness conveyed by these structural arrangements is rein­
forced by a survey of the Ministry's newly appointed personnel. The Minister him­
self, retired General S. Poniman, is a undistinguished but competent and loyal 
member of the Generation of '45. He is assisted by three Lieutenant-Generals, all 
well-regarded and capable officers, but all now re tire d .4 Otherwise, as the follow­
ing table underscores, the appointments are largely of obscure middle-ranking offi­
cers (many from the politically impotent navy and air force) and typically from the 
specialized services (finance corps, ordnance, engineers, medical corps, and so on). 
In other words, the institutional meagerness of the Ministry is matched by the polit­
ical insignificance of its staff.
3. Angkatan Bersenjata, November 9, 1983.
4. Two of them, Ignatius Jogi Supardi and Soekemi Soemantri, are prominent mem­
bers of the first class graduated from the Yogja Military Academy [1948]. We sug­
gested, in the analysis contained in Part 1 of this discussion, that one element in 
Suharto's maneuvering was to prevent any member of this group assuming any key 
position at the top of the Army prior to his retirement.
CH AR T I
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND SECURITY (HANKAM)
Z.I
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TA B LE A
Rank Army Navy A ir Force Police Civilian
L t.-G e n . or equivalent 3 (all retired) - 1 - -
Maj. Gen. or equivalent 1 1 2 - -
Brig. Gen. or equivalent 8 (1 retired) - - - 2
Colonel or equivalent 9 (1 retired) 9 - - -
Totals 21 10 3 0 2
The Pangab. Even without the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 60/1983, 
it was logical to infer that the Pangab would control virtually all the levers of power 
in the old structure— not least from what the Ministry had been assigned by Decree 
46/1983. One could also have noted the enormous disparity in the media attention 
paid to the Pangab as opposed to the M inister;5 and the Minister's explicit ces­
sion of control over Armed Forces' activities everywhere outside the capital. The 
service chiefs are directly subordinate to the Pangab, and, as their titles indicate, 
each is a staff officer, not, as he is, a commander (panglima). As Panglima, the 
Pangab also directly controls the operational chains of command down through the 
commanders (panglima) of the Kowilhan, Kodam, Korem, Kodim, and Koramil; as 
(once again) Commander (Panglima) of Kopkamtib, he directs the hierarchy of 
"security" operatives in the Armed Forces' territorial structure. Presidential De­
cree No. 60/1983 does however expand on this information and provide a fairly com­
plete picture of the formidable apparatus under the Pangab's authority. By the 
terms of the decree, ABRI is to be divided into three main components:
A . Headquarters (Mabes A B R I) ;
B. The Services ( i .e . ,  the Arm y, Navy, A ir Force, and Police); and
C . National Operations Commands, i .e .,  the National Strategic Command 
(Kostranas), the National A ir Defense Command (Kohanudnas), and the 
four Regional Defense Commands (Kowilhan 1 —I V ) .
B and C are both traditional and self-explanatory. A is neither. According to 
Degree 60/1983, Headquarters is to be stratified into four "levels [ tingkat]"  (rather 
than signifying ranks within a single chain of command, "level" appears more to de­
note mere status). These four levels are:
5. For example, immediately after the announcement of Presidential Decree 46/1983, 
Murdani, not Poniman, gave a mini-State of the Armed Forces' message. He noted 
that their present size of 425,000 (including the police) would not go higher than 
500,000 and that even this figure was very low proportional to the country's popu­
lation (about 1/300th). Estimating the Armed Forces' average cost, over the 1978-83 
period, at 3.27 percent of G .D .P . and 12.02 percent of the budget, he declared that 
in the future a major effort would be made to build up Indonesia's defense industry 
so as to avoid dependence on outside sources of supply. Angkatan Bersenjata, 
August 29, 1983. Furthermore, Murdani has twice during 1983 been featured on 
the cover of the popular weekly Tempo, Minister Poniman not once. The long inter­
view with Murdani contained in Tempo, October 15, 1983, on the future of the Armed 
Forces, makes no mention of Poniman, and by its tone and explicitness of detail dem­
onstrates the speaker's assurance of being the only real decision maker.
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I. The leader and deputy leader;6
II. Staff;
III. Support [pelayanan]; and
IV. Central executive bodies and staff.
The "staff level" includes a variety of positions and functions, but its institu­
tional core is composed of a Chief of the Ceneral Staff (Kasum), a Chief of the So­
cial and Political Staff (Kassospol), and an Inspector-General. The Chief of the 
General Staff is the same officer who was Chief of the Operations Staff in the old 
system ( i . e . , Lt. Gen. Himawan Sutanto), a continuity which reinforces our sense 
that the two titles cover largely the same function. A similar continuity of person­
nel (L t. Gen. Kharis Suhud) indicates that the Chief of the Social and Political Staff 
is basically the same as the old Chief of the Functional Affairs Staff (Kaskar). It 
has not yet been announced which subordinate staffs the two new Chiefs will direct, 
but it is likely, for reasons to be adduced below, that the Chief of the General Staff 
will retain Operations, Territorial Affairs, Communications and Electronics, and 
Security-and-Public Order; and will lose Intelligence, while gaining (from the old 
Administrative Staff) Logistics. The Chief of the Social and Political Staff will re­
tain Social-and-Political-Affairs and Functional Group Affairs.
Of particular interest is what has happened to General Planning, Finance, and, 
above all. Intelligence in the old structure. Sinar Harapan, which has good con­
tacts in the military, has suggested (November 23, 1983) that the function of Gen­
eral Planning "will probably be performed by a special staff directly under the 
Pangab," i .e .,  in practice on a par with the Chiefs of Staff. It is reported that 
the Armed Forces' financial affairs will be controlled by an Armed Forces' Financial 
Center, again directly under the Pangab— not the Minister of Defense. On Intelli­
gence, we are slightly more reliably informed. A new body has been created, en­
titled Bais-ABRI (Badan Intelijen Strategis AB R I— Armed Forces' Strategic Intelli­
gence Agency), with equal status to the Chiefs of Staffs— again directly under the 
hand of the Pangab. Press accounts indicate that this organ supersedes the old 
Ministry of Defense's Strategic Intelligence Center (Pusintelstrat Hankam), headed 
by the present Pangab from 1977 to 1983. 7 This elevation of Intelligence, while 
unorthodox from a standard military point of view, reflects the Indonesian reality 
that "intelligence is everything" and that the present Pangab has for a decade been 
his country's undisputed intelligence czar. Whether an Assistant for Intelligence 
will still exist, and who will operationally head Bais, are still matters which have 
not been made public, but this should not distract attention from the importance of 
recent developments.
lt remains only to emphasize one significant aspect of the new intelligence or­
gan's name: Badan (Agency) rather than Pusat (Center, as in Pusintelstrat). As 
Sinar Harapan describes it, the term Badan in ABRI parlance refers to an institu­
tion that imposes centralized control in its "field" throughout the Armed Services. 
Pusat, on the other hand, refers to an institution which replicates at the central 
level partly autonomous organizations within each of the services. Thus "Bais- 
ABRI probably will perform those intelligence functions within ABRI's domain which 
up till now were carried out by each of the services' intelligence staffs." In effect, 
the creation of Bais, its titling and its status, represent a concentration of "intelli­
6. It is reliably reported that General Murdani does not intend to fill this second 
post.
7. See Far Eastern Economic Review, February 9, 1984, pp. 18-19; Sinar Harapan, 
November 23, 1983.
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gence capabilities" in institutional terms which until now has only existed in personal 
terms— i.e .,  Benny Murdani's simultaneous holding of three key intelligence posi­
tions.
Level III need not detain us, since it comprises only the technical offices of 
General Secretariat (Setum), Armed Forces' Headquarters Detachment (Denma 
Mabes), and the Communications and Electronic Unit (Satkomiek). These all repre­
sent direct carryovers from the old Hankam system.
The fourth level— termed that of pelaksana pusat (central executive organs) —  
corresponds to the old "Heads of Agencies within the Department of Defense and 
Security" that we have traditionally catalogued. Presidential Decree 60/1983 or­
dains that of these 17 agencies no less than 13 remain (unchanged) with the Pang- 
ab, namely:
1. National Defense Institute (Lemhannas)
2. Armed Forces' Academy (Akabri)
3. Armed Forces' Staff and Command School (Sesko ABR I)
4. Armed Forces' Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal ABR I)
5. Armed Forces' Research and Development Center (Puslitbang ABR I)
6. Armed Forces' Historical Center (Pusjarah ABR I)
7. Armed Forces' Medical Center (Puskes ABR I)
8. Armed Forces' Military Police Center (Puspom ABR I)
9. Armed Forces' Information Center (Puspen ABR I)
10. Armed Forces' Survey and Mapping Center
11. Armed Forces' Legal Management Agency (Babinkum ABR I)
12. Armed Forces' Supply Agency (Babek ABR I)
13. Armed Forces' Functional Group Management Agency (Babinkar ABR I)
(O f the remaining four, three have effectively gone to the new Ministry of Defense, 
[see above p. 146], while Pusintelstrat has been transmogrified into B ais). It is 
also worth noting, in the light of the distinction between Agencies (Badan) and 
Centers (Pusat) referred to above, that all the old Agencies have remained with the 
Pangab. Indeed two of the most important of them, Babek and Babinkar, are held 
simultaneously by the Pangab's Assistants for Logistics and for Functional Group 
Affairs— who, in the persons of Major-Generals Dading Kalbuadi and C . I. Santoso, 
are key members of Murdani's inner circle.
Politics. Mention of Dading and Santoso brings us directly to the question of 
how far the appointments to the Mabes ABRI structure confirm the implications of 
the organizational-institutional picture. We can, it seems, be confident that struc­
ture and personnel are tightly interrelated. After all, the Pangab, General M ur- 
dani, has for much of the past decade been regarded as one of the two or three 
most powerful (if  not actually No. 2) men in Indonesia. This power derived opera­
tionally from his concurrently held positions as Assistant for Intelligence in the 
Ministry of Defense (since 1974), Head of the Strategic Intelligence Center since
1977, and Deputy Head of Bakin (the State Intelligence Coordinating Agency) since
1978. This combination of positions allowed him to dominate the complex net of in­
terlocking intelligence hierarchies through which Indonesia is effectively ruled.
But the fact that he was entrusted with these positions then, and with the Pangab- 
ship now, has everything to do with his personal and political relationship to Suhar­
to. It is likely that this relationship began at the time when Murdani held his last 
troop command, i .e .,  in 1962 when he led Paratroop Battalion 530 in operations 
against Dutch positions in West New Guinea. These operations were directed per­
sonally by Suharto, at that time the (first) commander of Kostrad, the Army's Stra­
tegic Reserve. The relationship must have rapidly become intimate and political, 
since by 1965 Murdani was Suharto's Assistant for Intelligence. He was a key
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player in the destruction of the Communist Party (1965-66), the overthrow of the 
Old Order (1966), and the ending of Confrontation with Malaysia (1966-67). After 
a stint as Liaison Officer ( i .e . ,  intelligence coordinator) in Kuala Lumpur, he went 
to serve as Charge d'Affaires in Seoul (1971-74), in the heyday of the regime of 
General Pak Chung Hee.
The Pak regime was in those days rather widely regarded as a successful model 
of an economically dynamic, military-controlled, anti-Communist, pro-American re­
gime, and there is some reason to think that Murdani was sent to discover what 
lessons might be learned from its political and economic successes. (These were 
the days before the OPEC oil bonanza). He was brought back to head Military In­
telligence in the wake of the anti-Tanaka (and antiregime) riots of January 1974.
In 1975 he led the group of military and intelligence specialists who successfully 
urged an iron fist v is -§ -vis  the nascent independence movement in East Timor. 
(Murdani's old mentor Ali Murtopo had argued for negotiations with Portugal and a 
series of "black" operations against Fretilin— but these had clearly failed by Novem­
ber 1975.) 8 Thereafter Murdani— though formally only a staff officer in charge of 
intelligence— ran the campaign for the "pacification" of East Timor. Finally, he 
played an important role in containing the last serious popular protest against Su­
harto's continuing rule— the student-led outbursts of 1978. It can thus be said 
that Murdani has been at hand, and played a supportive role, during virtually 
every crisis in Suharto's career over the past two decades. 9
Tru st is trust, to be sure. But it is typical of Suharto's political shrewdness 
and instinct for self-preservation that he has always played key subordinates off 
against one another. Why has such power been given to Murdani? Two sorts of 
answers suggest themselves. First, one striking feature (commented on by many 
observers) of the cabinet inaugurated on March 19, 1983 ( i .e . ,  when Poniman was 
installed as Minister of Defense and Murdani as Pangab) was that Suharto had finally 
disposed of the last of the group of military leaders who had helped him consolidate 
power and whom he had always balanced off against each o th e r.10
Gone (to comfortable, ceremonially attractive, but powerless posts) were: Ali 
Murtopo, Andi Mohammad Yusuf, Amir Machmud, Alamsyah, Mara dean Panggabean, 
and so forth. It was noted that for the first time Suharto felt powerful enough to 
dispense with all of them and pick a cabinet (and a vice-president) entirely of his 
personal choosing. In this light the selection of Murdani as Pangab made a certain 
sense. It showed that the President felt free to: (a) ignore the claims of the "tran­
sitional generation" in the Arm y, i .e .,  the first two classes graduated from the 
Yogya Military Academy in 1948-49; (b ) appoint as Pangab a man three years
8. See, e .g .,  Hamish McDonald, Suharto's Indonesia (Blackburn, Australia: Fon- 
tana/Collins, 1980), p. 207.
9. It might be added— even though the reference is not precisely to a crisis— that 
Murdani is widely believed to have personally directed the extrajudicial executions 
of at least 4,000 "criminals" (go//2) in the months immediately following his elevation 
to Pangab. See Far Eastern Economic Review, September 29, 1983. Although Mur­
dani has repeatedly denied this role, it has been indirectly confirmed by his former 
mentor Ali Murtopo, who told the press late in July that the killings were "in accord 
with normal Hankam procedures." It is, of course, inconceivable that these execu­
tions could have taken place without Presidential orders. (These gali2 frequently 
sported tattoos. This doubtlessly accounts for Murdani's otherwise strange state­
ment, made during a visit to the Armed Forces' Military Academy, that cadets were 
forbidden to have themselves tattooed. See Angkatan Bersenjata, August 3, 1983.)
10. See the rather pointed comments in Tempo, March 26, 1983.
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younger than his subordinate, the Army Chief of Staff; (c) elevate a man who had 
had no direct combat experience for twenty years. In other words, the appointment 
of Murdani was to be understood as an expression of Suharto's untrammeled will. 
Nonetheless, it should also be noted that Murdani is at least nominally a Catholic,
i .e .,  a member of a tiny religious minority in Indonesia, and thus presumptively un­
acceptable as a future head of state. (One assumes that if Murdani suddenly felt 
the call of the muezzin, his situation would be less secure.) He is also partly Euro­
pean (German) by descent, and again, one assumes that, since this fact has been 
well publicized, it is regarded as a fatal obstacle to any Murdani dreams of being 
Indonesia's third President one day.
One would expect, given the fact that an already very powerful man was being 
given an unprecedentedly powerful post, that the officers appointed under him 
would reflect this confluence. These expectations are borne out by the evidence 
available. The Pangab appears to sit in solitary eminence. As we have noted, the 
office of Deputy Pangab has not been filled. Murdani's two Chiefs of Staff are a 
curious pair, both notably older than he. Lt. Gen. Himawan Sutanto, Chief of the 
Operations Staff, is a prominent 1948 Yogya Military Academy graduate who will re­
tire next year without becoming either Army Chief of Staff or Pangab, as for years 
he might have expected. Lt. Gen. Kharis Suhud, Chief of the Functional Affairs 
Staff, is an old intelligence specialist, retired from active service, but who holds 
concurrently with this high position in the Armed Forces' power structure the post 
of Vice-Chairman of Parliament! 11 We may assume this straddle suits both Suharto 
and Murdani— it is certainly a most graphic symbol of the subordination of the legis­
lature to intelligence specialists in the executive.
Below these two older men on the way out come the key "assistants." The most 
politically important of these are the Assistantships for Territorial Affairs, Social 
and Political Affairs, Logistics, and Functional Group Affairs. Currently these 
posts are held by Major-Generals Eddy Nalapraya, Goenarso, Dading Kalbuadi, 
and C . I. Santoso. All have intelligence backgrounds, while the latter two are 
long-time Murdani associates from the P3AD of the early 1950s. Nalapraya was Mur­
dani's personal eyes-and-ears in the politically sensitive Kodam V (Greater Jakarta 
Territorial Command) while acting as Chief of Staff to Generals Norman Sasono and 
T r y  Soetrisno. Goenarso was intelligence chief for Kowilhan II (Java, Madura, Bali) 
before being appointed to head the Armed Forces' Information Center in 1978. Da­
ding was Murdani's long-time proconsul in East Tim or; C . I. Santoso ran counter­
insurgency operations in West Irian in the years 1978-82. It is probably an indica­
tion of Murdani's "excess of power" and of his political shrewdness that the man 
for some years regarded as the No. 2 figure in Indonesian intelligence, Maj. Gen.
P. Soebijakto, has been assigned to be Governor of the National Defense Institute.
The constellation of officers in Murdani's entourage is characterized above all 
by long experience in intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterinsurgency. It 
is perhaps worth concluding with a table indicating the relevant experiences in 
Timor and West Irian of some of the key new figures in the upper echelons of the 
Indonesian military's high command.
* * *
11. For explicit confirmation of this doubling as late as June 1983, see Angkatan 
Bersenjata, June 20, 1983.
TABLE B
Name MilitaryBackground Current Position
Experience in Timor or West Irian
Gen. Benny Murdani P3AD
Tim or
Pangab/Pangkopkamtib Has overall control of Timor policy, in part as Assis­
Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi P3AD Assistant for Logistics
tant-1, Hankam and Head, Strategic Intelligence 
Center.
Commander, East Timor "Battle Command" 1975-78;
Maj. Gen. Soeweno P3AD Pangkostrad
Commander, Kodam 16, 1978-83.
Commander, Kodam 16, 1976-78; Commander, Operasi
Lt. Gen. Yogie S. Memet P3AD Pangkowilhan II
Seroja 1979; Assistant-2 Operations, Hankam, 1981-83, 
Commander, Kopassandha, Special Warfare Command,
Maj. Gen. (Marines) Kahpi Marines Pangkowilhan IV
1978-83.
Ran Marines portion of Operasi Seroja 1979 in E. Timor.
Suriadiredja
Lt. Gen. Supardjo Breda Pangkowilhan III Assistant for Logistics, Hankam, 1981-83.
Maj. Gen. Soelarso Breda Pangdam 8 Deputy Assistant-1 to Army Chief of Staff, 19777-79;
Gen. Rudini Breda Army Chief of Staff
Assistant-1, 1981-83.
Commander, Kostrad's Airborne Battle Command,
Maj. Gen. T r y  Soetrisno Ak Tek AD Commander, Kodam 5
1976-77; Chief of Staff, Kostrad, 1977-78; Commander, 
Kostrad, 1981-83.
Chief of Staff, Kodam 16, 1978-79.
Maj. Gen. Edy Sudradjat AMN 1 Commander, Kodam 6 Commander, Kostrad's Airborne Battle Command,
Brig. Gen. R. K. Sembiring AMN 1 Commander, Kodam 17
19777-787; Chief of Staff, Joint Task Force, Hankam, 
for East Timor, 1978-79.
Commander, RTP-18 (Combat Regiment) in Operasi
Meliala
Brig. Gen. A . S. Rajagukguk AMN II Commander, Kodam 13
Seroja 1979.
Commander, Korem 164 (D ili), c. 1981-82.
Brig. Gen. Soetedjo AMN II Commander, Kodam 14 Group Commander in Kopassandha, 1975-76.
Maj. Gen. C. I. Santoso P3AD
West Ir ia n  (W est N ew  G u in e a )
Assistant for Functional Commander, Kodam 17, 1978-82.
Brig . Gen. Suripto AMN 1
Group Affairs, Pangab 
Commander, Kodam 3 Assistant-1, Kodam 17, 1974-77.
Brig. Gen. Nana Narundana AMN 1 Commander, Kodam 1 Chief of Staff, Kodam 17, 1979-83.
B rig. Gen. R. K. Sembiring AMN 1 Commander, Kodam 17 Commander, Kodam 17, 1982-
Meliala
Brig. Gen. Syamsudin AMN 1 Commander, Kodam 10 Chief of Staff, Kodam 17, 1977-82.
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The following list approximates as far as possible our usual format. As in Part I 
of this update, we have appended some biographical information, this time for only 
a few of the most important officeholders whose biographies were not included in 
the previous issue. An asterisk after the officer's name indicates that biographical 
information on him is given. For the abbreviations used, readers are referred to 
the glossary in our previous issue.
DEPARTM ENT OF DEFENSE AND S EC U R ITY  (HANKAM )
Minister
Gen. S. Poniman
Secretary-General12
Lt. Gen. Ignatius Jogi Supardi* 
(AMN Yogya I, 1948)
1. Chief, General Affairs Bureau
Brig. Gen. S. Momon H. Adiputra
2. Chief, Security Bureau
Navy Col. Sudiarsoyo
3. Chief, Organization Bureau 
Col. Ir .  Ibrahim Mardjoeki
4. Chief, Public Relations Bureau 
Col. Soenarso
28.I I I . 83
Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf 
Army Chief of Staff 
SI J
8 .X I .83
Chief of the Administrative Staff, 
Hankam
Artillery J
29.X I .83
Head, Army Finance Office 
Finance Corps Sundanese
29.X I .83 
?
N J
29.X I .83
7
7 7
29.X I .83
7
? J
12. The Secretary-Generalship is a transformation of the former function of Chief 
of the Administrative Staff, and is held by the same officer, Jogi Supardi. But its 
real power has been drastically reduced— it has lost control of the old personnel, 
logistics, and financial staffs, which have passed into the hands of General Murdani, 
the Commander-in-Chief (see below).
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5. Chief, Data Collection and Processing Bureau13 145
Navy Col. (E?) Ir . Djafar Basri
6. Chief, Foreign Relations Bureau
L t.-C o l. Drs. Soemijono
Inspector-General 
L t.-G e n . Widyo Sarwono*1‘*
1. Secretary
B rig . Gen. Soesilo Prawiro Sentono
2. Inspector for Program Implementation
B rig . Gen. S. H. Ismojo
3. Inspector for Personnel Management
B rig . Gen. (Titu la r) Selardi
29.X I .83
?
?
29.X I .83 
?
7
8.X I .83
Assistant for Finance, Hankam 
Finance Corps J
29.X I .83
7
Ordnance Corps
29.X I .83
7
Ordnance Corps
29.X I .83
7
4. Inspector for Finance and Supply
B rig . Gen. Drs. R. O. Sobandi 
Adisaputra
5. Inspector for Special Affairs
Navy Col. (A ) Suhardi R.
29.X I .83
7
7
29.X I .83
7
N
15Director-General for General Planning and Budgeting 
Rear-Admiral F. M. Parapat
? Sundanese?
8.X I .83
Assistant for Politics, Strategy, and 
General Planning, Hankam 
N J
13. This is apparently the old Data Gathering and Processing Center of Hankam.
14. As late as February 1984 Widyo Sarwono was concurrently holding both this 
position and his old job of Assistant for Finance, a post now under the Pangab (see 
below).
15. By Presidential Decree 46/1983, this first of three Director-Generalships direct­
ly under the Minister was to have a Secretariat and four subordinate Directorates. 
But by the time appointments to these latter were announced on November 29, the
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1. Secretary
B rig . Gen. (Titu la r) Sri Suharto 29.X I .83
7
2. Director of Budgeting and Expenditures
Navy Col. (A ) Amin Muhadi
3. Director of Control Management
Navy Col. (A ) Anis
4. Director of Financial Administration
Col. Soewastomo
29.X I .83
7
N
29.X I .83
7
N
29.X I .83
7
Finance Corps J
Director-General for Personnel, Manpower and Veterans' Affairs
L t.-G e n . Soekemi Soemantri*16 8.X I .83
(b . August 13, 1926, Magelang, C . Java) Assistant for Personnel and Man- 
(AMN Yogya I, 1948) power, Hankam
Cavalry J/S
1. Secretary
Col. N. K. Effendi 29.X I .83
7
7 7
2. Director of Mobilization/Demobilization and Civil Defense
Col. Tjahjono 29.X I .83
7
? J
3. Director of Personnel Indoctrination and Management
Col. Suyitno 29.X I .83
7
Adjutant-General J
Corps
Directorate for General Affairs had disappeared. Moving from a powerful position 
in the old Hankam structure. Admiral Parapat retained only the technical, nonpoliti­
cal elements of the job. "Politics and Strategy" remain under General Murdani's 
control.
16. Soemantri is concurrently Head of the National Research Center (Puscadnas), 
now also within the Ministry (see below). As Director-General it appears that he 
has been able to retain most of the functions he had in the earlier Hankam system.
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4. Director of Veterans' Indoctrination and Administration
Col. imam Basiran Hadisaputro 29.X I .83
(AMN Yogya II, 1949) ?
? J
Director-General for Materiel, Facilities, and Services
A ir Vice-Marshal Benjamin Parwoto 8 .X I .83
?
AF
1. Secretary
B rig . Gen. Azis Mugni
2. Director of Materiel
A ir First Marshal Mulyanto Anwar
3. Director of Facilities and Services 
B rig . Gen. Heru Gunadi
4. Director of Health and Rehabilitation 
A ir First Marshal D r. Susilo Widodo
5. Director of Supply [Pengadaan]
Navy Col. ( T )  Eman Abdul Rachman
Head, Agency for Industrial/Technological 
Research and Development [B P P I& T]17
B rig. Gen. Hardijono
1. Secretary
Navy Col. (Kes) Drs. Soerastomo
2. Chief, Center for Science/Technology 
Research and Development
Navy Col. (K h ) Ir . Sarworo
J (Catholic)
29.X I .83
General Inspector of Supply, Hankam 
Engineers ?
29.X I . 83 
?
AF J
29.X I .83 
?
Engineers J
29.XI.83
7
Medical Corps J
29.X I .83
7
Navy S
8 .X I .83
Head, Data Gathering and Processing 
Center, Hankam 
Artillery J
29.XI.83
7
Navy J
29.X I .83
7
Navy J
17. This agency is directly under the Minister.
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3. Chief, Center for Raw Materials/lnfrastructure 
Research and Development
Navy Col. (K h) Ir. K. Harsono 29.X I .83
?
Navy J
4. Chief, Center for Industrial Research and Development
Col. Ir . Eddie Soeharja 29.X I .83
?
Finance Corps
Head, Armed Forces' National Reserves Center (Puscadanas)X8
1. Maj. Gen. R. A . Saleh*
(b . May 13, 1928, Jakarta)
2. L t.-G e n . Soekemi Soemantri
Head, Education and Training Center18 9 
Maj. Gen. Muhartono
15.11.82 -  ?
Maj. Gen. Julius Henuhili 
Commander, Kodam I 
SI S
7
Assistant for Personnel and Man­
power Development 
Cavalry J/S
8.X I .83
Maj. Gen. Drs. Abdulkadir
Head, Management Institute, Hankam
Artillery J
ARMED FORCES HEADQUARTERS (Mabes A B R I )  
I. Commander-in-Chief
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin ("Benny") 
Murdani
(b . October 2, 1932, Cepu)
(P3AD)
Commander of Kopkamtib
Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani
28.111.83
Gen. Andi Mohammad Yusuf 
Assistant for Security, Hankam; 
Head, Strategic Intelligence Cen­
ter; Deputy Head, Bakin 
RPKAD J
29.111.83
Admiral R. Sudomo 
As above
RPKAD J
18. This Center has been transferred from the old agency structure of Hankam, 
and is directly under the Minister.
19. This apparently replaces the old Management Institute in the former Hankam 
structure, of which Muhartono was also head.
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II. Staff Echelon
1. Chief of the General Staff (Kasum )20
Lt. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto*
(b . September 14, 1929, Magetan) 
(AMN Yogya I, 1948)
2. Chief of the Social and Political Staff 
Lt. Gen. M. Kharis Suhud*
3. Inspector General (Irjen ABRI)
Lt. Gen. Gunawan Wibisono*
Assistant for Intelligence
1. Gen. Leonardus Benjamin Murdani
2. Maj. Gen. M. I. Sutaryo
Assistant for Operations 
Lt. Gen. M. San if*
Assistant for Territorial Affairs
1. Maj. Gen. Naya Iskandar Sumantri
(AMN Yogya I, 1948)
2. Maj. Gen. Eddy Marzuki Nalapraya
(b . 1930)
c. February 1983 
Vice-Admiral Muhammad Romly 
Commander of Kowilhan III 
SI J
(Kassospol) 21
11. IX .78 
Gen. Darjatmo 
Ambassador to Bangkok 
SI J
? (1983)
Inspector General of the Army 
RPKAD ?
5.V I I .74 -  ?
Maj. Gen. M. Kharis Suhud 
Charge d'Affaires, Seoul 
RPKAD J
?. VI1.81
Maj. Gen. Seno Hartono 
Commander, Kodam II 
SI S
?.V I I I .81 -  c. 30.V . 83 (c . 21 months) 
Maj. Gen. Andi Azis Bustam 
Chief of Staff, Kowilhan II 
Kodam V S?
c. 30.V.83
Chief of Staff, Kodam V 
Kodam V Jakartan
20. This position replaces the former Chief of the Operations Staff. Gen. Sutanto 
is scheduled to retire in late 1985.
21. This position replaces that of the former Chief of the Functional Affairs Staff 
(Kaskar). Gen. Kharis Suhud is concurrently, and has been for some time, Vice- 
Chairman of Parliament. (See Angkatan Bersenjata, June 20, 1983.) He officially 
retired on January 17, 1983.
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Assistant for Communications and Electronics
A ir Vice-Marshal Tedjo Suwarno
Assistant for Security and Social Order 
1. Police Maj. Gen. Issukandar
2. Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Poerwata
Assistant for Personnel 
1. Lt. Gen. Soekemi Soemantri
2. Maj. Gen. Suharto22
Assistant for Logistics
1. Lt. Gen. Supardjo
(b . August 21, 1929, Nganjuk) 
(AMN Yogya II, 1949)
2. Maj. Gen. Dading Kalbuadi* 
(b . April 14, 1931, Cilacap) 
(P3AD)
Assistant for Finance
Lt. Gen. Widyo Sarwono*23
27.V I I .78
Maj. Gen. Drs. Suryadi 
Deputy Assistant for Communications 
and Electronics 
AF J
19.11.77 -  ?
Police Maj. Gen. Drs. Achmad 
Mauludin
Governor, Police Division, Armed 
Forces' Academy 
Pol ice J
?
?
Police J?
?.VI1.78 -
Maj. Gen. Susilo Sudarman 
Assistant for International Coopera­
tion, Hankam
Cavalry J/S
?
?
? J
7.V.81-C. February 1983 (c . 21 months) 
Rear-Admiral R. Kasenda 
Fifth Assistant to the Army Chief 
of Staff
D J
c. February 1983 
Commander, Kodam XVI 
RPKAD J
6 .IX .75
Maj. Gen. Suhanto 
Officer seconded to the Army Chief 
of Staff
Finance Corps J
22. It is unclear which Suharto this is. Nor is it clear whether this position still 
exists, as the latest references to it are from August 1983.
23. Lt. Gen. Widyo Sarwono has retained this post ad interim, in addition to his 
appointment as Inspector General in Hankam (see note 14 above).
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Assistant for Social and Political Affairs 
Maj. Gen. Goenarso S .F .*
Assistant for Functional Group Affairs
B rig . Gen. Chalimi Imam Santoso*2h 
(b . c. 1930-31)
(P3AD)
4.111.80
B rig . Gen. Prapto Prajitno 
Head, Armed Forces' Information 
Center
B J
30. V . 83 
?
Commander, Kodam XVII 
RPKAD J
The following three bodies are directly under the Pangab; their staffs have 
apparently not yet been formed:
A . Strategic Policy and General Planning Staff (Srenum)
B. Armed Forces'Financial Center
C . Badan Intelijen Strategis ABRI (B ais-ABR I) 24 5
Central Executive Organs (Lakpus)
1. Governor, National Defense Institute (Lemhannas)
1. Lt. Gen. Sutopo Juwono 13.X I .78 -  31.V.83 (54£ months)
(b . May 27, 1927, Klaten) Lt. Gen. Sajidiman
Ambassador to The Hague 
SI J
31.V.83 -
Officer seconded to the Commander- 
in-Chief
B? J
2. Commander-General, Armed Forces' Academy (Akabri)
1. Lt. Gen. Julius Henuhili 29.X I I .80 -  7 .V I .83 (29 months)
(b . November 27, 1928) Maj. Gen. Susilo Sudarman
(AMN Yogya I, 1948) Head, Armed Forces' National
Reserves Center
Artillery/SI Timorese
2. Maj. Gen. Soebfjakto*26
(b . August 17, 1929, Wates) 
( B reda)
24. It is unclear who Santoso's predecessor was. Maj. Gen. Satibi Darwis held the 
position from about January 1974 to September 1978. After that, it seems to have 
been held on an interim basis by Satibi's deputy. Brig. Gen. Susanto J . ,  but this 
is not certain.
25. This body replaces the former Strategic Intelligence Center, which Murdani 
headed. It is unclear who heads the new body, though there has been speculation 
in the press that Murdani's former deputies Sudibjo Rahardjo and Muhammad Arifin 
will be top figures there.
26. Soebijakto was until recently a close aide to Murdani and the Number 2 man in 
intelligence.
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2. Lt. Gen. Murgito*
(b . January 18, 1928)
(P3AD)
3. Commander-General, Armed Forces' Staff 
and Command School (Sesko ABR I)
1. Vice-Admiral Prasodjo Mahdi
(b . January 13, 1927, Madiun)
2. A ir Vice-Marshal Arfed Riyadi*
7.V I . 83
Commander, Kodam V III 
B J
7.V.81 -  16.V . 83 (24 months) 
Vice-Admiral R. E. Suprapto 
Commander, Armada 
Navy J
16.V.83
Commander, Combined A ir Strike 
Command (Kopatdara)
A ir Force ?
4. Head, Armed Forces' Mental Upbuilding Center (Pusbintal)
1. B rig . Gen. M. Soegeng Widjaja ? (1980) -  ?
Maj. Gen. Drs. Sumitro Kartosujono 
B J?
2. Rear-Admiral D r. Tarmizi Taher 7
?
Navy 7
5. Head, Research and Development Center (Puslitbang)
1. Ma). Gen. Otty Soekotjo 6 .X I .78 -  7.11.83 (c . 52 months)
A ir Vice-Marshal D r. R. Sunarjo 
Head, Army Communications Service 
Signal Corps J
2. Maj. Gen. Theo Soemantri* 7.11.83
(Breda) Head, Army Data Collection and
Processing Center 
7 J
6. Head, Armed Forces' Historical Center (Pusjarah)
1. B rig . Gen. (Titu la r) Drs. Nugroho 7 (1977) -  7 (1982)
Notosusanto (None, new position)
J
2. B rig . Gen. Gatot Surjadi 7 (1982)
7. Head, Armed Forces' Medical Center (Puskes)
B rig . Gen. D r. Kurnia Natadisastra c. 2.V I . 79
B rig. Gen. Dr. Abdullah Hasan
7
Medical Corps S
8. Armed Forces' Military Police Center (Puspom)
1. Maj. Gen. Kartojo 31.V I I .78 -  7
Maj. Gen. Atam Surakusumah 
Army Provost-General
CPM J
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2. B rig . Gen. Gatot Matrai ?
?
CPM J
9. Head, Armed Forces' Information Center (Puspen)
1. B rig . Gen. Drs. Encung A .S .*  4. I I I . 8 0 - 17.V I . 83 (39£ months)
(b . July 31, 1928, Cilacap) B rig . Gen. Goenarso S .F .
Deputy Head, Armed Forces' Infor­
mation Center 
Information Service J
2. B rig . Gen. Emir H. Mangaweang 17.V I . 83
7
7 7
10.
11.
12 .
Head, Armed Forces' Survey and Mapping Center
B rig . Gen. Utaryo Surodirono 8 .X I .83
Vice-Admiral D. U. Martojo 
Topography Corps J
Head, Legal Upbuilding Board (Babinkum )27
Head, Armed Forces' Supply Agency (Babek)
1. Maj. Gen. Haryo Suroso c. V.79 -  82?
Maj. Gen. Drs. Suraryo Iskandar
2. Maj. Gen. M. R. Sunardjo
3. Maj. Gen. Dadmg Kalbuadi*28
13. Head, Armed Forces' Functional Group 
Upbuilding Board (Babinkar)
1. Maj. Gen. Mansyur 
(b . 1925)
2. Maj. Gen. Widodo Mulatto 
(AMN Yogya II, 1949)
82? -  c. 111.83
7
? J
c. 111.83
Commander, Kodam XVI 
RPKAD J
15.V I . 77 -  ?
Maj. Gen. Suharto 
Member, DPR 
SI S
? -  29.V .83
7
? J
27. It is unclear who now holds this position. The last known occupant, Lt. Gen.
E. J . Kanter SH has been retired for some time and is in charge of the government's 
top anticorruption agency.
28. Dading is also Assistant for Logistics, the first time these two functions have 
been performed by the same person.
3. B rig . Gen. Chalimi Imam Santoso*29 29.V.83
Commander, Kodam XVII 
RPKAD J
Commander, National Strategic Command (Kostranas)
1. A ir Vice-Marshal Sukardi 18.IV .81 - c .  Jan. 1983? (c. 20 months)
(b . December 1931, Bojonegoro) Maj. Gen. R. Himawan Sutanto
Deputy Commander, Kowilhan II 
A ir Force J
2. A ir First Marshal Roesmart* c. Jan. 1983 -
(b . c. 1933, Karanganyar, Kebumen) Chief of Staff, Kostranas
A ir Force J
Commander, National A ir Defense Command (Kohanudnas)
Air Vice-Marshal Iskandar* 9.X.78 -
A ir Vice-Marshal Suwondo 
Governor, A ir Force Division, Armed 
Forces' Academy 
A ir Force J
Biographies
Aried Riyadi
? -66 Colonel. Head, Bureau of Supplies (Biro Pengadaan), A ir Force.
67- 68 Director of Operations, A ir Force.
68- 69 Chief of Staff, Kodau 5, Jakarta.
69- 70 Commodore. Commander-General, A ir Force Education Command (Kodik)
at Kaliurang.
? -83 A ir Vice-Marshal. Combined A ir Strike Command (Kopatdara).
83- Commander-General, Armed Forces' Staff and Command School.
Dading Kalbuadi
b. 14. IV. 1931, Cilacap. Attended SMP in Purwokerto, SMA in Solo, graduating 
in 1957 {sic) .
(51-52?)
55
57
58-?
63
65
?
73-75?
75-78
78-83
(P3AD)
Entered military (? sic).
Attended Infantry Company Grade Officers' Course, Bandung.
In RPKAD. Rose from platoon commander to company commander, to 
liaison officer, to logistics officer, to commander of Group II.
Received training in the US.
Received training in the USSR.
Graduated from Army Staff and Command School (Seskoad).
Colonel. Commander, Region V (Bien Hoa), of Indonesian contingent 
under International Commission for Control and Supervision (IC C S ) 
of the cease-fire in Vietnam (Caruda V ) .
B rig . Gen. Commander, "Defense Territory" of East Timor.
Commander, Kodam 16.
29. C . I. Santoso also holds the post of Assistant for Functional Group Affairs, 
the first time this duplication has occurred.
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83- Maj. Gen. Assistant for Logistics, Materiel Development and Installa­
tions, Dept, of Defense and Security; head of the Armed Forces' 
Supply Board.
Speaks English, Dutch, Javanese.
Encung A . S .,  Drs. (sospol)
b. 31.VI 1.1928, Cilacap. Son of R. Soenarjo Brotosuwarjo. A Protestant.
46 Joined army as corporal.
47- In Tentara Pelajar (Student A rm y).
49 Fought in Banyumas.
57-? Head, Information Staff, Kodam 13.
62-65 Assistant Chief, Army Information Service, Jakarta.
65-67 Information Chief, Ampera Cabinet.
68-72 Head, Baglis (?) /Production, Army Information Service.
72-76 Action Officer, Armed Forces' Information Center.
76-80 Deputy Head, Armed Forces' Information Center.
80-83 Head, Armed Forces' Information Center.
died 27.V I I .83.
Goenarso S .F .
66 Major. Attached to Kodam 7.
68 Lieut.-Col. Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam 13, and head of local
Intelligence Task Force (Satgas Intel).
? -78 Colonel. Assistant-1 (Security), Kowilhan II.
78-80 B rig . Gen. Head, Armed Forces' Information Center.
80- Maj. Gen. Assistant for Social and Political Affairs, Dept, of Defense 
and Security.
Gunawan Wibisono
66 Colonel. On RPKAD staff.
75-76 Commander, Garuda 8/2. Middle East (Suez).
? -78 B rig . Gen. Chief of Staff, Kodam 8.
78-81 Governor, Armed Forces' Academy, Army Division.
83- Lt. Gen. Inspector-General, ABR I.
Himawan Sutanto, R.
b. 14.I X .1929, Magetan.
48 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy (Class I ) .
49- 50 Second Lieutenant. Platoon commander in Battalion 204 (Battalion
Nasuhi), in Ciamis.
50- 51 Platoon commander. Battalion 204, in Bangka.
51- 55 First Lieutenant. Company commander. Battalion 204, in Bangka.
55- 57 First Lieutenant, then Capt. Operations officer with the Sixth Regi­
ment, in Lampung.
56- 57 Took A ir Liaison Officer Course.
57- 59 Company commander. Army Military Academy's Cadet Regiment.
59- 60 Took Associate Infantry Officer Course, Ft. Benning.
60 Major. Staff instructor. Military Academy.
60- 61 Staff officer with Indonesian contingent to UN Forces in the Congo
(Garuda I I ) .
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61-64 Commander, Battalion 330/Kujang I, of Kodam 6 and Kostrad, in S. 
Sulawesi, fighting Kahar Muzakar.
64 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Military District Command 0609, Kodam 6, in
Bandung kabupaten.
64-66 Chief of Staff, Brigade 15, Kodam 6, in Sukabumi.
66-68 Colonel. Commander, Brigade 17/Airborne, comprising paratroop 
Battalions 305, 328, and 330.
66 Also commander, "Sadaguri" Satgas for presidential security, Bogor.
68-70 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 6.
70-72 Colonel, then Brig. Gen. Deputy Commander, Armed Forces' Academy, 
General and Army Division.
72-74 Commander, Kodam 4.
74- 75 Maj. Gen. Commander, Kostrad.
75- 78 Commander, Kodam 6.
78-81 Commander, Kostranas.
81-83 Lt. Gen. Commander, Kowilhan III.
83- Chief of the Operations Staff, Dept, of Defense and Security.
Iskandar
? -68 Colonel. Operations Officer, A ir Defense Command (Kohanud).
68-72 Chief of Staff, National A ir Defense Command (Kohanudhas).
72-? First A ir Marshal. Commander, Kodau 1, in N. Sumatra, 
c. 75 Governor, Armed Forces' Academy, A ir Force Division.
78- A ir Vice-Marshal. Commander, Kohanudnas.
Jogi Supardi, Ignatius
48 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy (Class I ) .
56 Captain. Assistant Military Attache in Peking.
57 Assistant Military Attache in New Delhi.
58 Major. Commander, Field Artillery Education Center, Cimahi.
62 Lieut.-Col. Commander, Field Artillery Education Center, Medan.
64-66 Commander, Artillery Brigade, Kostrad.
66-68? Colonel. Assistant-3 (Personnel), Kostrad.
68 Studied at Lemhannas.
69?-71 Colonel, then B rig . Gen. Deputy Assistant-3 (Personnel) to the Army 
Chief of Staff.
72-74 Commander, Kodam 16.
74-76 Commander, Seskoad.
76- 80 Maj. Gen. Assistant for Politics, Strategy and General Planning, Dept.
of Defense and Security.
80- Lt. Gen. Chief of the Administrative Staff, Dept, of Defense and 
Security.
Catholic.
Murgito
b. 18.1.1928.
48 Second Lieutenant. Headed Depot Section of a battalion in East Java.
51-52? Trained at P3AD.
? -69 Lieut.-Col. Chief of Staff, Korem 081, Kodam 8, in Madiun.
69-? Head of Information, Kodam 8.
71 Studied at Seskoad.
71 Commander, Second Infantry Brigade, Kostrad.
167
? Commander, Military Sub-Area Command 083, Kodam 8, in Malang.
73 Colonel. Commander, Region I (H ue), of Indonesian contingent to
ICCS in Vietnam (Garuda V ).
76 Chief of Staff, Kodam 9.
? -80 Chief of Staff, Kodam 8.
80- 81 B rig . Gen. Commander, Kodam 9.
81- 83 Maj. Gen. Commander, Kodam 8.
83- Lt. Gen. Commander-General, Armed Forces' Academy.
Fluent in Dutch and English.
Roesman
b. c. 1933 in Karanganyar, Kebumen. Younger brother of former A ir Force 
Chief of Staff Rusmin Nurjadin.
54 Graduated from Flight School at Kalijati (Bandung)
In 50s Studied at Flight Instructor School, Halim air base (Jak arta ); taught at 
Kalijati and the Adisucipto air base.
in 60s Commander of Squadron 11; of Squadron 14 (Mig-21s) in Wing 003 at 
Iswahyudi air base (Maospati).
66-68 Colonel. Commander, Halim air base. (His brother was then head of 
the A ir Force.)
68-70? Commodore. Headed the A ir Force Academy.
707-71 Deputy Chief of Staff, Kostranas.
71 — ? Chief of Staff of Kostranas.
? A ir Vice-Marshal. Commander of Kostranas.
Saleh, R. A .
b. 13.V . 1928, Jakarta. High school education in the colonial period.
45 Attended the infant Military Academy at Tangerang.
60 Attended Jungle Warfare School, Singapore.
65- 66 Commander, Kodim 0416, Kodam 4, in Muara Bungo, South Sumatra.
66- 68 Assistant-2 (Operations), Kodam 1.
68-71? Deputy Chief of Staff, Kodam 1.
75- 76 Defense Attache in Manila.
76- 78? Chief of Staff, Kodam 1.
78- 82 B rig . Gen. Commander, Kodam 1.
82- Maj. Gen. Head, Armed Forces' National Reserves Center.
Sanif, M.
62-65 Major. Commander, Battalion 328/Para, Kodam 6 and Kostrad.
62? Decorated for role in capture of D I/TII "Imam," Sekarmadji Kartosuwirjo. 
66-68 Lieut.-C ol. Chief of Staff, Airborne Brigade 17/Kujang under Himawan. 
68-71 Colonel. Commander of Airborne Brigade 17.
71-79 Commander of Infantry Training Center (Pussenif).
79- 80 B rig . Gen. Commander, Kodam 12.
80- 81 Commander, Kodam 2.
81- Maj. Gen. Assistant for Operations, Dept, of Defense and Security.
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Santoso, Chalimi Imam 
b. c. 1930-31.
51-52? Graduated from P3AD.
65-66 Major. Commander of Battalion 1/RPKAD (Paratroop Regiment)/Kostrad. 
66 Attended Kupalda (Advanced Officers' Training C ourse)-!I in Bandung.
67-? Lieut.-Col. Commander of newly formed Croup IV/RPKAD.
? -78 B rig . Gen. Chief of Staff, Kodam 10.
78-82 Commander, Kodam 17.
82- Assistant for Functional Group Affairs, Dept, of Defense and Security.
83- Head, Armed Forces'Functional Group Upbuilding Board.
Fluent in Dutch.
Sarwono, Widyo
64 Lieut.-Col. Head of Finance, Kodam 7.
67 Assistant-1, Army Finance Directorate.
73 B rig . Gen. Head, Army Finance Center.
75- Maj. Gen. Assistant for Finance, Dept, of Defense and Security.
Soebijakto, P.
b. 17.V I I I . 1929, in Wates.
c . 47-49 
55
61-62
?
65-68
68-69
70-71
73
? -77 
77-?
? -83 
83-
Fought with TR IP  (E . Java) and TP  (C . Java).
Graduated from the Dutch Military Academy at Breda.
Artillery Advanced Course in the US.
Commander, Battalion 13/105 Kostrad (s/c).
Assistant Military Attache in Moscow.
On the intelligence/operations staff of the Army Chief of Staff. 
Studied at Seskoad.
International Defense Management Course, in the US. 
Graduated from Lemhannas.
Defense Attache in Moscow.
Seconded to the Commander-in-Chief (intelligence).
Maj. Gen. Governor, Lemhannas.
Suhud, M. Kharis (Charis) 
b. c. 1928 in West Java.
50-53 Capt. Commander, Battalion 326, Kodam 6.
53- 54 Acting Chief of Staff, Bandung Garrison Command, and Assistant for
Intelligence.
54- 55 Studied at Seskoad.
56- 57 Chief of Staff, Bandung Garrison Command.
57- 61 Assistant-1 (Intelligence), Kodam 6.
61-62 Studied at Ft. Leavenworth.
67?-70 B rig . Gen. Military attache, Washington, D .C .
70- 71 Assistant-1 (Intelligence) to the Army Chief of Staff.
71- 74 Maj. Gen. Head of G-1 (Intelligence), Hankam.
74-78? Ambassador to Bangkok.
78- Lt. Gen. Chief of Staff for Functional Affairs, Hankam.
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Soekemi Soemantri
b. 13.V I I I . 1926 in Magelang, son of R. M. S. Sosrorawito and Sundanese wife.
48 Graduated from Yogya Military Academy (Class I ) .
50-52 Attached to Armored unit.
60-61 Took Advanced Officers' Training Course-11.
60-62 Capt. Military Attache in Bonn.
62-63? Lieut.-C ol. Commander, Fifth Cavalry Battalion, Kodam 4.
6 ?
7
7
Studied at Seskoad (Class 4).
Chief of Staff, Cavalry Training Center.
Deputy Director for Education Development, Dept, of Defense and
7
Security.
Deputy Director for Materiel Development, Dept, of Defense and 
Security.
? -74 Deputy Assistant for Materiel Development, Dept, of Defense and
74
Security.
B rig . Gen. Commander of Indonesian contingent to ICCS in Vietnam 
(Garuda V I I ) .
75-78 Maj. Gen. Assistant for International Cooperation, Dept, of Defense
78-
and Security.
Lt. Gen. Assistant for Personnel and Manpower Development, Dept, of 
Defense and Security.
Soemantri, Theo
55 Graduated from Dutch Military Academy in Breda, Artillery section.
68-? Major. Chief of Staff, A ir Defense Regiment, Kodam 2.
83?- Maj. Gen. Head, Research and Development Center, Dept, of Defense 
and Security.
